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In re Wachovia Shareholders Litigation: The Case for the
Common Benefit Doctrine
Wachovia Corporation and First Union Corporation announced
their proposed merger on April 15, 2001.' Subsequently, in
opposition to the planned merger, eight named plaintiffs brought
seven lawsuits against Wachovia claiming Wachovia's directors
breached their fiduciary duties.2 These shareholder suits were
consolidated into one class action on July 6, 2001. 3 On July 20, the
North Carolina Business Court held that certain "cross option
provisions"4 in the merger agreement were valid, but the "termination
provisions 5 contained therein were not.6 The parties modified the
merger agreement to comply with the court order, and on July 31,
First Union's shareholders approved the merger.7  Wachovia's
shareholders followed with the approval of the merger on August 38
On September 13, 2002, the court dismissed the remainder of the
shareholders' claims with prejudice and granted them thirty days to
file a fee petition.' The business court granted the plaintiff's fee
request based on the common law doctrine known as the common
benefit or corporate benefit rule. ° Wachovia appealed the ruling,
and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the business
court's award of attorney's fees, holding that prior panels of the court
of appeals had declined to adopt the common benefit doctrine into
1. In re Wachovia S'holders Litig. (Wachovia 11), 168 N.C. App. 135, 136, 607 S.E.2d
48, 49 (2005).
2. Id. A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is brought pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-8-30 (2005). For the elements of the claim, see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
3. In re Wachovia S'holders Litig. (Wachovia 1), No. 01 CVS 4486, 2003 WL
22996328, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003), rev'd, 168 N.C. App. 135, 607 S.E.2d 48
(2005).
4. See Wachovia II, 168 N.C. App. at 136, 607 S.E.2d at 49 (describing the cross
option device as a mechanism that would operate to award the jilted partner a $780
million "break-up fee" if the merger failed and the other party merged with another
partner within 18 months).
5. See id. (explaining that "[u]nder the non-termination provision, Wachovia and
First Union agreed their merger agreement would not terminate until January of 2002
even if either of their shareholders failed to approve the merger in the initial vote").




10. Id. at *15, *20. For a discussion of the common benefit doctrine, see infra notes
17-23 and accompanying text.
COMMON BENEFIT DOCTRINE
the North Carolina common law.1 The North Carolina Supreme
Court denied review. 2
This Recent Development argues that North Carolina should
adopt the common benefit doctrine and permit the award of
attorney's fees in shareholder class action suits that confer a
substantial benefit on a corporation. If the doctrine of stare decisis
prevents the North Carolina appellate courts from incorporating the
common benefit doctrine into the common law, the North Carolina
General Assembly should enact legislation adopting the doctrine. A
similar statute permitting the award of attorney's fees in derivative
suits already exists. This Recent Development proceeds by first
comparing derivative suits to shareholder class action suits and then
argues that shareholder class actions, because of fewer procedural
impediments than derivative suits, are a better mechanism for
litigating claims of breach of fiduciary duty arising from mergers. In
order to encourage profit-motivated plaintiffs' attorneys13 to bring
breach of fiduciary duty claims contesting a merger as shareholder
class actions, attorney's fees must be awardable when either a
common fund or common benefit has been secured. Otherwise, these
attorneys will direct their efforts toward less efficient derivative
claims, where attorney's fees are awardable by statute.
Absent statutory authority, attorney's fees are generally not
recoverable in North Carolina, 4 and no North Carolina statute
currently permits recovery of attorney's fees in shareholder class
action suits. 5 However, there are exceptions to this rule, grounded in
the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment,16 known as the common
11. Wachovia II, 168 N.C. App. at 139-41, 607 S.E.2d at 51-52 (citing Madden v.
Chase, 84 N.C. App. 289,292, 352 S.E.2d 456,458 (1987)).
12. In re Wachovia S'holders Litig. (Wachovia II), 359 N.C. 411, 613 S.E.2d 25
(2005).
13. See John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implication of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678 (1986) (discussing "the concept of the plaintiff's attorney as
an entrepreneur who performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable
conduct").
14. Wachovia II, 168 N.C. App. at 138, 607 S.E.2d at 50 (citing Horner v. Chamber of
Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 97, 72 S.E.2d 21, 22 (1952)). This is a generally accepted common
law doctrine known as the "American Rule." See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (enunciating the American Rule as simply,
"f[in the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorney's fee from the loser").
15. However, attorney's fees are recoverable in derivative suits. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-7-46 (2005).
16. The common fund and common benefit doctrine both "rest[] on the perception
that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are
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fund and common benefit doctrines.17 The common benefit doctrine
rejected in Wachovia II allows the award of attorney's fees when a
common benefit has been secured.18 The common benefit doctrine
provides that:
[A] litigant who confers a common ... benefit upon an
ascertainable stockholder class is entitled to an award of
counsel fees and expenses for its efforts in creating the benefit
.... [T]o be entitled to an award of fees under the [common]
benefit doctrine, an applicant must show ... that: (1) the suit
was meritorious when filed; (2) the action producing benefit to
the corporation was taken by the defendants before a judicial
resolution was achieved; and (3) the resulting corporate benefit
was causally related to the lawsuit. 9
Although North Carolina has not adopted the common benefit
doctrine, it has adopted its close counterpart, the common fund
doctrine.2 The common fund doctrine permits a court
without statutory authorization, [to] order an allowance for
attorney fees to a litigant who at his own expense has
maintained a successful suit for the preservation, protection, or
increase of a common fund or of common property, or who has
unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense." Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444
U.S. 472, 478 (1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized these equitable
underpinnings as early as 1890. See Gay v. Davis, 107 N.C. 269, 269, 12 S.E. 194, 194-
95 (1890) ("In the absence of statutory provision, the courts, in the exercise of chancery
powers, [can] make allowances [of] ... reasonable compensation to counsel .... .
17. Wachovia 11, 168 N.C. App. at 138, 607 S.E.2d at 50-51.
18. Id. at 141-42, 607 S.E.2d at 52. A common benefit is distinguished from a
common fund by the fact that a common benefit may be non-monetary. See Mills v. Elec.
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) ("The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and
may never produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid does not
preclude an award based on th[e common benefit.]").
19. United Vanguard Fund v. Takecare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997). Judge
Tennille adopted a very similar framework for North Carolina in In re Quintiles
Transnational Corp. Shareholder Litigigation, No. 02 CVS 5348, 2003 WL 22998088, at *2
(N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003), filed the same day as Wachovia I, holding that:
[a]s a general rule, the trial court should determine three things before deciding
the amount of the fee .... First, the court looks to see if the action was
meritorious at the time it was filed .... Second, it must determine that there was
an ascertainable benefit received by the class. Third, it must determine if there
existed a causal connection between the action and the benefit.
20. See Horner v. Chamber of Commerce of Burlington, 236 N.C. 96, 98, 72 S.E.2d 21,
22 (1952) (noting that the common fund doctrine has been applied by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in various classes of cases).
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created at his own expense or brought into court a fund, which
others may share with him. 1
Accordingly, attorney's fees are generally recoverable when a class
action results in the securing of a common fund22 but not when a class
action secures a common benefit. 3
A large amount of shareholder litigation is initiated as a result of
proposed mergers. Regulation of mergers of publicly owned
corporations is almost completely the domain of state law.24  The
merger of North Carolina corporations must follow the procedure
laid out in section 55-11-03 of the North Carolina General Statutes in
order for the merger to be lawful.25 Shareholders can bring two types
of lawsuits to contest the merger: derivative or shareholder class
action suits.
2 6
The method of challenging corporate conduct that many
traditionally identify with shareholder-brought litigation is the
derivative suit. A derivative suit is "brought by one or more
21. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of N.C. v. Blong, 159 N.C. App. 365, 374, 583 S.E.2d 307,
313-14 (2003) (quoting Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 159-60, 500 S.E.2d 54, 71-72 (1998)).
22. Faulkenbury v. Teachers' & State Employees' Ret. Sys. of N.C., 345 N.C. 683, 697,
483 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1997) (applying the common fund doctrine to class action lawsuits).
23. Wachovia II, 168 N.C. App. at 140-41, 607 S.E.2d at 51-52. In the underlying
litigation that gave rise to Wachovia I, the substantial benefit conferred by the litigation
was the invalidation of a deal protection device, which, if allowed to stand, would have
tied the hands of the shareholders when voting to approve the merger by greatly
penalizing the corporation that did not approve the merger. See First Union Corp. v.
Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 01 CVS-4486, 2001 WL 1885686, at *38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10,
2001) (holding that the non-termination provision created a "coercive condition impeding
the free exercise of the Wachovia shareholder's right to vote on the merger"). What is
important to note is that only equitable relief was available to invalidate this termination
provision, as is the case with the invalidation of any deal protection device. Interview with
Ben F. Tennille, Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, North
Carolina Business Court, in Greensboro, N.C. (Aug. 10, 2006). Therefore, although the
corporation is benefited, it is not benefited financially. Id. Thus, litigation attacking
unlawful deal protection devices can never result in securing a common fund. Id.
24. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Gale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) ("State law
continues to provide the legal skeleton for the corporate form, and state fiduciary duty
litigation continues as a mechanism frequently utilized to monitor managers.").
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03 (2005); see also Carolina Coach Co. v. Hartness,
198 N.C. 524, 528, 152 S.E. 489, 491 (1930) ("Legislative sanction is essential, not only to
the creation, but to the merger or consolidation of corporations.").
26. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135 (2004).
Recently, shareholder class action suits in mergers and acquisitions have become the
dominant form of corporate litigation, outnumbering derivative suits by a wide margin.
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shareholders to enforce a claim that belongs to the corporation.
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However, a derivative suit is not an efficient method for bringing a
breach of fiduciary duty claim in the context of mergers because of
the procedural hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome before the
claim can be resolved, particularly the demand requirement and the
dismissal procedure.
The demand requirement mandates that the shareholder
plaintiffs must serve a demand on the corporation to take appropriate
action to correct the alleged misconduct or bring the lawsuit itself
ninety days before a derivative suit is filed. 28 As a consequence of this
approximately three month hiatus, the shareholder plaintiff must
delay the start of legal proceedings, allowing the alleged misconduct
to continue to cause injury to the corporation. However, North
Carolina recognizes two exceptions to the demand requirement. One
exception allows plaintiffs to bypass this requirement if they can show
that irreparable harm to the corporation would result if they must
wait for the ninety days to expire.29 Entitlement to this exception may
be difficult to prove due to the absence of a clear standard of what
constitutes irreparable harm." The second exception arises if the
corporation notifies the plaintiff that it has refused the demand.31 A
third common exception, known as the futility exception, is not
recognized in North Carolina.32 Thus, as a result of the lack of a clear
27. RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, III, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW § 17.01 (6th ed. 2000). A shareholder may not bring a derivative suit unless the
shareholder was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act giving rise to the
claim or became a shareholder "through transfer by operation of law from one who was a
shareholder at that time; and ... [f]airly and adequately represents the interests of the
corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-41.
28. § 55-7-42; see also Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 540, 324 S.E.2d 878, 881
(1985), modified and afffd, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987) ("The demand
requirement serves the ... purpose of allowing the corporation the opportunity to remedy
the alleged problem without resort to judicial actions, or, if the problem cannot be
remedied without judicial action, to allow the corporation, as the true beneficial party, the
opportunity to bring suits first against the alleged wrongdoers.").
29. § 55-742.
30. Due to a lack of cases dealing with the issue, it is unclear what constitutes a
showing of irreparable harm in North Carolina. However, Judge Tennille, in a separate
decision, indicated that a pleading claiming irreparable harm to the corporation may be
insufficient absent a pleading of breach of fiduciary duty by the directors. Winters v. First
Union Corp., No. 01 CVS 5362, 2001 WL 34000144, at *2-*3 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 12,
2001).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-42(2).
32. For an explanation of the futility exception see Alford, 320 N.C. at 471-72, 358
S.E.2d at 327 ("An equitable exception to the demand requirement may be invoked when
the directors who are in control of the corporation are the same ones (or under the control
of the same ones) as were initially responsible for the breaches of duty alleged. In such
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standard in pleading irreparable harm, the fact that early notification
of refusal is unlikely, and the unavailability of the futility exception,
the demand requirement is a significant procedural hurdle for a
plaintiff to overcome and will often unnecessarily delay the resolution
of pending derivative litigation.
The other procedural hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome in a
derivative suit is surviving the corporation's potential motion to
dismiss.33 A court can dismiss an action upon a motion of the
corporation if a group of independent directors of that corporation
charged with considering whether the claim is in the best interest of
the corporation recommends seeking dismissal.34 The rationale for
using independent directors to assess the merits of derivative suits is
that independent directors are not beholden to management, and thus
they are best positioned to make the decision whether a derivative
suit will be in the best interest of the corporation.35 However, the
assumption that independent directors are truly independent of
management may be questioned.36 Accordingly, it may be difficult
case, the demand of a shareholder upon directors ... would be futile and as such is not
required for the maintenance of the action.").
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-44(a) ("The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding on
motion of the corporation if one of the groups specified in subsection (b) or (f) of this
section determines in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry ... that the
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the corporation.").
34. § 55-7-44(b). This decision to dismiss is
made by: (1) A majority vote of independent directors present at the meeting of
the board of directors if the independent directors constitute a quorum; or (2) A
majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors
appointed by majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the
board of directors, whether or not the independent directors constituted a
quorum.
Id. In the alternative, "[t]he court may appoint a panel of one or more independent
persons upon motion of the corporation to make a determination whether the suit shall be
dismissed." Id. § 55-7-44(f). This committee is often known as the special litigation
committee. If the suit does survive dismissal, then it cannot be settled or discontinued
absent the permission of the court. Id. § 55-7-45.
35. James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83, 83-84 (1985) (arguing that in the context of mergers, the belief that independent
directors act solely in the interest of shareholders and not, in some degree, in their own
self interest is an "unsubstantiated belief").
36. Id. at 84-85 ("[S]everal psychological mechanisms can be expected to generate
subtle, but powerful, biases which result in the independent directors' reaching a decision
insulating colleagues on the board from legal sanctions."). But cf. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.,
Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence,
90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2005) ("While bias taints the decisionmaking process, it is
certainly not the only criterion that determines the overall quality of the resulting
decision.").
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for the derivative plaintiff to avoid having the suit dismissed by the
independent directors because they may be inclined to favor a pro-
management resolution of the suit, such as dismissal, over the
continuance of meritorious litigation. Therefore, the prospect of the
special litigation committee dismissing meritorious claims makes this
procedure all the more onerous. However, if the derivative suit clears
all of these hurdles and is resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff can recover "reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees.
3 7
Shareholders can also contest the merger of the corporation and
assert their shareholder rights via a shareholder class action suit.38
Although derivative suits and shareholder class actions can arise from
the same acts of corporate directors, shareholder class action suits do
not have to contend with the same procedural obstacles as derivative
suits.39 Class action lawsuits are brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a party to sue
on behalf of a class when it is "impracticable" to bring all the parties
before the court and adequate representation can be ensured.4' Once
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-46. Furthermore, the court can order the plaintiff to pay
the defendant's expenses "incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the
proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper
purpose." Id. § 55-7-46(2). In addition, the court is authorized to award a party its
expenses when an opposing party files a
pleading, motion, or other paper, if the court finds.. . [it] was not well grounded in
fact or was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it was interposed ...
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
Id. § 55-7-46(3).
38. ROBINSON, supra note 27, at § 24.01. An important distinction between the
lawsuits is that a class action can only bring a claim alleging an injury to the individual
shareholder's rights, while in derivative suits, the injury is to the corporation and the
plaintiff is suing on its behalf. Id.
39. ROBINSON, supra note 27, § 24.01. See In re Wachovia S'holders Litig. (Wachovia
I), No. 01 CVS 4486, 2003 WL 22996328, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003), rev'd, 168
N.C. App. 135, 607 S.E.2d 48 (2005) ("In the context of a proposed merger containing deal
protection devices, the derivative statute does not work particularly well.").
40. N.C. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In North Carolina, "a 'class exists ... when the named and
unnamed members each have an interest in either the same issue of law or fact, and that
issue predominates over issues affecting only individual class members." Crow v. Citicorp
Acceptance Co., 319 N.C. 274, 280, 354 S.E.2d 459, 464 (1987). To show impracticability,
plaintiffs must "demonstrate substantial difficulty or inconvenience in joining all members
of the class. There can be no firm rule for determining when a class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impractical." Id. at 283, 354 S.E.2d at 466. To ensure adequate
representation, the plaintiffs must show that:
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an action is certified as a class action, the court must approve any
subsequent settlement or dismissal.41 Furthermore, judges have
broad discretion on whether to certify a class.42 They also have
discretion in selecting who will serve as lead counsel, what claims will
be litigated, and who can be included in the class.43
A breach of fiduciary duty claim can be brought as either a
derivative suit or a class action.' A breach of fiduciary duty claim is
based on the allegation that a director violated one of the duties she
owes to the corporation. In the context of proposed mergers, breach
of fiduciary duty claims brought by shareholders serve as potent
vehicles for asserting the rights of shareholders.
they have a personal, and not just a technical or official, interest in the action.
Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged representatives are members
of the class and that the interest of absent class members will be adequately
protected .... This requirement is not necessarily one of numbers, but is
dependant on the adequacy and vigor with which those parties will protect the
interests of the class.
English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 41 N.C. App. 1, 7, 254 S.E.2d 223, 230 (1979)
(citations omitted), overruled by Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 319 N.C. 274, 354
S.E.2d 459 (1987).
41. N.C. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
42. See Maffei v. Alert Cable T.V. of N.C., Inc., 316 N.C. 615, 617,392 S.E.2d 867,870
(1986) ("[D]eciding whether to certify a class, a trial judge has broad discretion and may
consider factors not expressly mentioned in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23.").
43. See Wachovia 1, 2003 WL 22996328, at *6 (stating that "[tihere is less flexibility in
a derivative action than in a class action, where the court can define the class and the
claims to be pursued"). In In re Quintiles Transnational Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 02 CVS
5348, 2003 WL 22998088, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003), Judge Tennille noted that:
[t]he selection of lead counsel is seldom based upon the first to file rule.
Increasingly courts are looking for class representatives who have a substantial
interest in the litigation and who will fulfill their role as class representatives. The
courts are also looking for counsel who have given some thought and research to
their complaints and have not just pulled a form out of the file and rushed to the
courthouse.
The benefit of this discretion is that judges, in certifying shareholder class actions, can
effectively police the action by appointing lead counsel and defining who may be a
member of the class; this policing function may help eliminate frivolous actions.
44. See Wachovia 1, 2003 WL 22996328, at *6 ("In most jurisdictions complaints based
upon breach of fiduciary duty in the acquisition context are brought as class actions. The
derivative action is generally reserved for conflict of interest claims .... ).
45. Section 55-8-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes requires that a director
shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a
committee: (1) [i]n good faith; (2) [w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) [i]n a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (2005).
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Breach of fiduciary duty claims brought in the context of mergers
are best brought as state shareholder class actions because class
actions allow for greater flexibility and speed in resolving the claim,'
thus saving both parties court costs and other litigation expenses.
Speed is crucial in mergers. The longer it takes to complete a merger,
the greater the risk of third-party bids and lawsuits challenging the
merger.47 In addition, uncertainty about the success of the merger can
lower share prices, and a timely merger best dispenses with this
uncertainty.48 The directors of corporations recognize the need for
mergers to be completed quickly and structure their merger deals
accordingly.49 Judge Tennille noted the existence of this need in
Wachovia I, stating that "[c]ompanies desiring to consummate a
merger will generally move as swiftly as possible to complete the
transaction .... There are sound business reasons for the rapidity
",50
Due to the accelerated time frame of merger deals, derivative
suits are an undesirable way to bring breach of fiduciary duty claims
because their burdensome procedural requirements delay litigation.51
As Judge Tennille noted, "[our] derivative statute does not
adequately or specifically address the time pressure created in the
merger of publicly traded companies."52  One of these procedural
hurdles, the demand requirement, requires the plaintiff to sit on his
hands for three months before bringing his claim. 53  This hiatus is
often futile because it is unlikely that the demand made upon the
46. See Wachovia 1, 2003 WL 22996328, at *13 (arguing that a derivative action
contesting a merger creates "needless procedural steps" that delay litigation; and,
therefore, a derivative suit is not the "best vehicle for protecting shareholder interests.").
47. LEO HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND TARGETS: MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S. 126 (1990) (stating that "[t]he risk of competition increases as
the time between execution of the acquisition agreement and the actual change of control
increases"). During the merger that is the subject of this Recent Development, the risk
was realized that a third party would make a hostile bid before the merger was finalized.
SunTrust Banks unsuccessfully attempted a hostile takeover in "one of the most expensive
and highly publicized takeover battles in banking history." Lijun K. Yang, First Union v.
Sun Trust Banks: The Fight for Wachovia and Its Impact on North Carolina Corporate
Law, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 335, 336 (2002).
48. Wachovia I, 2003 WL 22996328, at *4 (stating that parties to merger desire that
the merger be consummated quickly to avoid intervening factors, such as "natural disaster,
financial market changes, strikes, and government intervention[,]" that negatively affect a
merger).
49. See id. at *4.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *5.
52. Id.
53. Id. (arguing that "the ninety-day waiting period embodied in the statute does not
provide a realistic time frame within which to deal with challenges to proposed mergers").
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corporation by the shareholder will be accepted. The demand would
most certainly call for a change in the merger proceedings, which the
board of directors would be extremely reluctant to undertake in light
of the need to expediently plan and execute the merger. 4 As a result,
not only does the demand requirement delay litigation, it does so
unnecessarily because there is little reason to expect the corporation
will undertake the action for which the demand calls.55
Class action lawsuits have no requirements that cause such a
delay, thus they are the better method of quickly resolving a
shareholder breach of fiduciary duty claim. Class action plaintiffs can
(and often do) file the action the day the merger is announced.
Therefore, class actions as a whole are usually initiated earlier than
derivative suits. 6 In a sample of complaints filed in the Delaware
Court of Chancery during the years 1999-2000, Robert B. Thompson
and Randall S. Thomas found that eleven percent of the complaints
brought as derivative suits are filed within three days of the date of
54. Id. (noting that in "the acquisition environment, the board, in all probability, has
considered the deal protection devices incorporated in the merger agreement at some
length and, after consultation with counsel and investment bankers, has determined that to
include those protections in the merger agreement would be in the best interest of the
corporation"). Also, it is important to note that often the demand is made on the same
directors who are accused of wrongdoing; thus, it follows that these directors usually will
not acquiesce to accusations of wrongdoing by granting the derivative plaintiff's demand
to modify actions that they have taken. See Tamar Frankel & Wayne M. Barsky, The
Power Struggle Between Shareholders and Directors: The Demand Requirement in
Derivative Suits, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 41 (1983) ("If the directors are substantially
implicated as defendants, demand on them, in some cases, is held to be 'futile.' "). To
avoid this conflict of interest, the futility exception was created, but as already noted,
North Carolina has expressly refused to incorporate it into state law.
55. Judge Tennille, in Wachovia I, argued that "[t]he speed with which transactions
are completed requires that the ninety-day [demand] period be shortened. However, the
mechanism for shortening the ninety-day waiting period is unclear." Wachovia 1, 2003 WL
22996328, at *5. Therefore, as a minimum, if the common benefit doctrine is not adopted
into North Carolina law, the General Assembly should provide a straightforward
mechanism that allows a plaintiff to petition the court to shorten the demand period in a
derivative suit. As argued above, in light of the speed with which mergers are
consummated, the demand requirement renders a derivative suit wholly inadequate in
large measure because of the artificial delay that it mandates. Accordingly, the creation of
a straightforward procedure for seeking a judicially ordered shortening of the demand
period could address this deficiency, and would provide plaintiffs with a more suitable way
to bring a suit contesting the merger of two corporations.
56. See John F. Olson et at., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification, and Discovery
Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1104 (1996) ("Less than five hours after
Philip Morris announced it would reduce the price of Marlboro cigarettes by forty cents a
pack, causing expected earnings to drop as much as forty percent, plaintiffs' lawyers filed
the initial complaint."). This rush to file claims against corporations was termed a "race to
the court house" in the House Conference Report accompanying the PSLRA of 1995. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,731.
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the challenged transaction, whereas about two-thirds of class actions
are filed within that time frame. 7 Initiating the litigation earlier
provides a benefit for the corporation, which has a strong interest in
resolving any litigation that contests the merger as quickly as
possible.58 Immediate filing also benefits the plaintiff, whose right as
a shareholder to serve as a corporate watchdog will not be
handicapped by an unnecessary delay.
Derivative suits are also ill-suited for contesting mergers and
acquisitions due to a second procedural hurdle, the dismissal process.
This process not only consumes the corporation's resources by
requiring an investigation of the claims, it also allows the corporation
to easily disregard or dispose of claims that could provide a legitimate
benefit to the corporation. As Judge Tennille noted in Wachovia I
and as argued earlier in this Recent Development, the independence
of the directors who evaluate the claim is questionable. 9 In addition,
the decision to attempt to merge with another corporation is not one
that is reached quickly or lightly by the directors. The decision is a
major event in the life of a corporation and can be very risky, so it is
unlikely that the special litigation committee, which may be
influenced by pro-management biases, would question the merger
plans by allowing a derivative suit.60 Thus, a derivative claim that
contests the planned merger faces a steep uphill procedural battle
before the claims are considered.61 As a result, legitimate claims may
be discontinued to the detriment of shareholders and the corporation.
In contrast, a state class action cannot be dismissed on the
recommendation of the corporation. The shareholder class action
claim is independent of the corporation, and because of its
certification as a class action, it cannot be dismissed or settled without
first receiving the permission of the court.62 Thus, shareholder class
actions will continue in the face of the corporation's resistance and
can often result in a hard-won benefit for the corporation.
57. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 26, at 182 ("Clearly, derivative lawsuit
attorneys are not in a race to the courthouse.").
58. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
60. See Wachovia I, 2003 WL 22996328, at *5 (arguing that the extent to which the
board has analyzed and considered the deal protections would weigh heavily against
adopting a proposed modification).
61. See id.
62. N.C. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
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Another advantage of class actions is that they very frequently
result in settlement.63 Settlement is a more efficient way of resolving
disputes than trial and courts encourage settlement as a matter of
public policy.6' In the context of shareholder-initiated claims,
settlement can reduce litigation expenses because the parties will not
require legal services for a trial, which can be lengthy and expensive.
Additionally, the settlement can be negotiated to include reasonable
attorney's fees for the shareholder's attorney and a compromise
decision to correct whatever deficiency in the directors' conduct is the
subject of the claim. This result can be mutually advantageous to
both parties and relatively inexpensive to secure.
Despite these advantages of class action suits, one rationale
offered in support of derivative suits' dismissal and demand
procedures is that they provide a way for corporations to dispose of
vexatious strike suits. Strike suits are lawsuits, particularly derivative
actions, which are brought by shareholders and are "often based on
no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to
obtain a favorable or inflated settlement."65  The United States
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA)6 6 to reduce the abuses of strike suits.6 7  However,
many class action suits filed in state court claiming breach of fiduciary
duty still pose a serious threat to corporations because they are not
governed by PSLRA 6 or a subsequent act, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),69 as long as the class contains
fewer than fifty members.7°
63. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591,
648 (2006) (finding after conducting a nationwide survey of federal and state class actions
that "almost all certified class actions settle"); see also Bryant G. Garth, Symposium,
Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action: Introduction, 62 IND. L.J. 497, 501
(1987) (noting that, in a study of forty-six certified class actions in the Northern District of
California, thirty-six such cases were settled and only ten were litigated).
64. See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 CIV. 3288(DLC), 2005 WL
2319118, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2005) (stating that "public policy favors settlement,
especially in the case of class actions").
65. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004).
66. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (Conf. Rep.) (listing the automatic filing of a
lawsuit when a corporation's share price drops, the "targeting of deep pocket
defendants[,]" using the discovery process to increase the cost of defending an action in
order to force a settlement, among others, as abuses the act strove to prevent). These
characteristics are the hallmarks of strike suits.
68. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2000).
69. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(p) (2000)).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f). Attorneys were able to elude the requirements of PSLRA by
filing claims in state courts under state law. See Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227(2)
2006] 2077
2078 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
To counter the threat posed by strike suits, North Carolina
should adopt practices to discourage attorneys from bringing these
abusive suits. The North Carolina General Assembly can enact rules
of civil procedure that apply some of the protections present in
PSLRA to class actions bringing claims of breach of fiduciary duties.
For example, PSLRA requires courts to review whether each party
has complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,71
and if the court finds a violation, the imposition of sanctions is
mandatory.72 The General Assembly can adopt a similar provision
for shareholder class actions in North Carolina that mandates review
of each party's compliance with Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure73 and requires that a court impose sanctions if it
finds a violation. It is interesting to note that similar sanctions are
provided for in the statute that governs derivative suits.74 This threat
of sanctions for meritless claims would discourage profit-seeking
attorneys from filing frivolous strike suits alleging breach of fiduciary
duty. Furthermore, active judicial discretion in certifying the class
can effectively police the claims and prevent strike suits from ever
coming into being.
("Since the enactment of [PSLRA], considerable evidence has been presented to Congress
that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State
courts."). In response to this tactic, Congress passed SLUSA, which removed "covered
class actions" with over fifty named plaintiffs that allege "an untrue statement or omission
of material fact ... or that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security" to
federal court. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(p)(b); see also Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,__ U.S ____
126 S. Ct. 1503, 1510-11 (2006) (discussing Congress's aims in enacting PSLRA and
SLUSA). It is important to note that PSLRA and SLUSA are not applicable to the class
action suit that is the subject of this Recent Development because the claim brought in
Wachovia was a pure breach of fiduciary duty claim and did not include a claim of
misrepresentation in connection with the sale or purchase of securities.
71. Rule 11 requires each attorney to certify that her pleading, motion, or other paper
that is presented to the court is not filed to harass, delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation, and that any allegation, contention, or denial of factual contention within are
supported by evidence or are likely to be so supported after time for discovery. FED. R.
Civ. P. 11(b).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c)(1)-(2).
73. N.C. R. Civ. P. 11. The North Carolina version of Rule 11 closely mirrors the
federal rule in that it requires that every attorney filing a court document must certify that
it was not filed to harass, delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation, and where this
rule is violated, sanctions are warranted. See id.
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-46 (2005).
75. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Judge Tennille suggested this point
in Wachovia 1. See In re Wachovia S'holders Litig. (Wachovia 1), No. 01 CVS 4486, 2003
WL 22996328, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003), rev'd, 168 N.C. App. 135, 607 S.E.2d
48 (2005) ("The derivative action ... does not afford the trial court the degree of
supervision it might exercise in the class action setting.").
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In addition, there are further safeguards that the courts can
impose to reduce possible abuses of the common benefit doctrine as
applied in shareholder class actions. First, by awarding attorney's
fees only when a shareholder class action secures a considerable and
definable "substantial benefit" for the corporation, courts can ensure
that the incentive to litigate only arises when it creates something of
definite value to the corporation. If North Carolina adopts a high
standard for what constitutes a substantial common benefit, attorneys
will not file claims when the chances of the litigation resulting in the
conferral of a substantial benefit is questionable. As profit-motivated
actors, attorneys likely will not risk outlaying expenses on suits whose
success in securing a common benefit for the corporation is remote.
If the incentive for bringing meritless strike suits is reduced, attorneys
will bring them less often.
As an additional safeguard against potential abuses of the
common benefit doctrine, courts should demand that the plaintiff
prove the existence of a strong causal connection between the benefit
and the litigation before awarding fees in common benefit claims.
Because of the tenuous nature of a "substantial benefit," courts may
be tempted to accept a nebulous causal connection. To avoid this
result, courts should demand a showing of a direct link between the
litigation and the resulting substantial benefit. Lastly, courts must be
sure to award only what they consider necessary attorney's fees and
not fees that are the result of frivolous legal work aimed solely at
increasing the fee award. The court should place the burden on the
plaintiffs attorney to prove that the fees incurred were reasonably
necessary to the litigation, and the court should make a searching
inquiry into the fee request. This burden will put plaintiffs' attorneys
on notice not to incur unnecessary fees by unduly extending litigation.
In adopting the common benefit doctrine by judicial decision or
legislation, North Carolina would be following the example of
Delaware, which has adopted the common benefit doctrine,76 as well
as the United States Supreme Court.77 The award of fees in both
shareholder class actions and derivative suits serves as an engine that
drives beneficial private oversight of corporations, which can protect
corporations from the improper or unadvised decisions of its
76. See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Del. 1989) ("In the
realm of corporate litigation, the Court may order the payment of counsel fees and related
expenses to a plaintiff whose efforts result in the creation of a common fund, or the
conferring of a corporate benefit.") (citations omitted).
77. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,391-92 (1970).
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directors.78 Attorneys file these suits in the hope of obtaining a fee
award, but corporations reap the benefits of this economically
motivated behavior when unlawful actions are corrected. However,
these suits come at a price, which should be addressed by requiring a
corporation to pay for the litigation that achieved the common
benefit. Because fee awards drive private oversight of corporations,
North Carolina should allow the award of fees when necessary to
encourage this activity. The North Carolina General Assembly and
North Carolina courts have recognized the benefits of fee-driven
private oversight of corporations and have fostered it by allowing the
award of fees in derivative suits and when litigation results in the
securing of a common fund. As such, the state is not well served by
precluding the award of fees when a common benefit is secured,
especially in the context of state shareholder class actions contesting a
merger.
It is interesting that section 55-7-46 of the North Carolina
General Statutes provides for the recovery of attorney's fees in
derivative suits when a substantial benefit has been conferred on a
corporation. 79 This statute codifies the common benefit doctrine in
the context of derivative suits8" and signals legislative approval of the
doctrine. In light of the preceding arguments, it does not follow that
the General Assembly should award attorney's fees in derivative suits
when a common benefit is secured, but not in a shareholder brought
class action securing the same.
Some may argue that derivative suits provide procedural
protections that help ensure the fee award does not attract vexatious
suits, while class action suits do not provide the same protections. In
addition, it could be argued that because the plaintiff in derivative
suits is suing on behalf of the corporation, the plaintiff should not
bear the cost of the litigation, whereas the plaintiffs in the class
actions are suing on their own behalf and therefore should bear the
costs of litigation. However, these distinctions may prove to be
illusory. If the recommendations replicating the protections of
78. See In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S'holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(stating that in Delaware "[o]ur legal system has privatized in part the enforcement
mechanism for policing fiduciaries by allowing private attorneys to bring suits on behalf of
nominal shareholder plaintiffs. In so doing, corporations are safeguarded from fiduciary
breaches and shareholders thereby benefit.").
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-46 (2005).
80. See id. This statute authorizes a court to "[o]rder the corporation to pay the
plaintiff's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in the proceeding if it




PSLRA are adopted in North Carolina, courts show a willingness to
exercise their discretion in managing class action claims, and fee
awards are strictly reviewed for propriety, there would be ample
protections against strike suits in class actions claiming breach of
fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the substantial benefit that would result
in class action litigation would benefit both the corporation and the
shareholders. Thus, like the derivative plaintiff, the class action
plaintiff is pursuing a result that would benefit the corporation as a
whole, not just himself.8 ' Accordingly, the class action plaintiff should
not bear the cost of litigation himself. The case for the adoption of
the common benefit doctrine is further bolstered by its similarity to
the common fund doctrine, which North Carolina already recognizes.
The adoption of the common benefit doctrine would be a mere
extension of the equitable common fund doctrine.
In conclusion, advocating the award of attorney's fees often
raises the eyebrows of those who believe that plaintiffs' attorneys
take advantage of fee awards at the expense of corporations and
shareholders. While this may be true in some instances, a tightly
controlled regime of awarding attorney's fees based on the common
benefit doctrine can protect against these abuses. The Wachovia/First
Union Merger resulted in the creation of the nation's fourth largest
bank. Perhaps in light of the overall result, the fact that class action
litigation resulted in the invalidation of a deal protection device may
seem lilliputian. However, the power of shareholders to police
mergers effectively is not. As North Carolina becomes home to more
and more public corporations, the law must take account of the
change and seek to provide a system that ensures both business
growth and proper corporate governance. By incorporating the
common benefit doctrine, North Carolina can continue its progress
down this important path.
E. TAYLOR STUKES
81. For example, in the lawsuit that is the subject of this Recent Development, the
court found that the merger agreement contained an unlawful provision that "tied the
hands of Wachovia's board in an impermissible manner." See In re Wachovia S'holders
Litig. (Wachovia I), No. 01 CVS 4486, 2003 WL 22996328, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19,
2003), rev'd, 168 N.C. App. 135, 607 S.E.2d 48 (2005).
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